It is certain that, as symbolic structuralists (such as Michel Foucault defines it in the case of science) remind us, the di-rection of change depends on the state of the system of possibilities (conceptual, stylistic, etc.) inherited from history. It is these possibilities which define what is possible or not possible to think or do at a given moment in any determined field. But it is no less certain that the direction of change also depends on the interests (often completely disinterested according to the canons of ordinary existence) guiding agents, as a function of their position in the social structure of the field of production…(Rules p. 206)
The social sciences are in a situation that is hardly favorable to the establishment of such a realist relation to theoretical heritage; judgments continue to be guided by the values of originality, which are those of the literary, artistic or philosophical fields. (…) even if an active appropriation and an accomplished mastery of a mode of scientific thought are as difficult and precious (and not only for the scientific effects they produce) as was its initial invention (…) they are often mocked and discredited as a servile imitation of an epigone, or as a mechanical application of an already invented art of inventing. But, just as music may be made not to be rather passively listened to, or even played, but to open the way to composition, so scientific works, in contrast to theoretical texts, call not for contemplation or dissertation, but for practical confrontation with experience; to truly understand them means to activate in relation to a different object the mode of thought they express, to reactivate it in a new act of production, just as inventive and original as the initial one, and completely opposed to the de-realizing commentary of the lector, an impotent and sterilizing metadiscourse. (rules p. 180)
”In reality, no field of thought is more conservative than science: Each change necessarily encompasses previous knowledge. Science grows like a tree, ring by ring. Einstein did not prove the works of Newton wrong; He provided a larger setting within which some contractions and asymmetries in the earlier physics disappeared. (Holton Intellec/Mod. Science and int. Tradition p. 186)
French Histo epist tradition - Canguilhem .- Cavailles (compare Kuhn)..
Bachelard's invention of the sharpest criterion for any science's state of the art - Canguilhem...
Gonseth - text find omkring bruge relativitetsteori/fysisk forskning til udvikling samfunds.
Joseph Ben-David
Bohr - literature... inspiration
Social Science - Durkheim, Marx, Weber... causality..
Bourdieu - If the truth is relationel - then you can know nothing about an institution..
- Norbert Elias bog.. all science is relationel
Realism as a philosophy of science is dead...
And the best illustration of what marks the difference between the epistemic and the empiric individual is the way in which at a certain point of the analysis we can observe the fusion of more than one pair of empirical individuals (…) They become indistinguishable … (Bourdieu Homo p. 23)
“It should be noted in passing that most applications outside science merely reveals ignorance about science. For ex-ample, relativism in nonscientific fields is generally based on farfetched analogies. Relativity theory, of course, does not find that truth depends on the point of view of the observer, but, on the contrary, reformulates the law of physics so that they hold good for every observer, no matter how he moves or where he stands. Its central meaning is that the most valued truths in science are wholly independent of the point of view.” (Holton Intellectuals p.186)
sml. Polanyi ang. Newton .- og sml. Bourdieu... art taste..
antropolog citat om gå død... Sml. Bourdieu netop taget ...
Relational Ontology - Cassirer, Norbert Elias book - samt Bourdieu if ... know nothing...
still re-teaching old philosophy of substance ontology...
